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Introduction 
The European economy, and to a lesser degree the US economy, have been in the midst of 
economic crisis after the bursting of property and stock bubble in 2008, facing with financial crisis, 
accumulated national deficits, and radically reduced consumer demand. Japan met with similar crisis on 
the occasion of the bursting of its bubble in 1990, and has since suffered from stagnant economy for 
more than two decades.  
Economic crisis and ensuing austere times pose challenges to competition law enforcement as well 
as competition policy. This paper looks into elements which calls for special consideration on the part of 
competition law and policy agencies, with the objective of finding a balanced approach to be taken by 
competition agencies as well as national governments. Part I examines industrial policy and economic 
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regulation in times of economic crisis viewed from the point of competition policy. Part II deals with 
specific issues in competition law enforcement in times of economic difficulties: exemptions; depression 
cartels; failing company defense in merger control. 
I. Industrial policy, Regulatory Reform and Competition Policy in 
times of Economic Crisis 
 
A. To Bailout or Not to Bailout Failing Companies—Industrial Policy versus Competition 
Policy 
Economy needs to constantly innovate, accompanied with creative destruction (as put forth by 
Joseph Schumpeter). Nevertheless, in times of economic difficulties, vested interests exert pressure on 
policy makers to temporarily preserve employment through governmental bailout of failed companies.
1
 
Politically easy measures, then, preserve inefficient companies in outmoded industries (i.e. non-digital 
photography), thus retarding industry restructuring. Notable economists pointed out that Japan’s 
prolonged economic stagnation (“the lost two decades”) owes at least partly to the government and 
banks’ bailout of inefficient companies.  
Bankruptcy procedure needs to be prioritized over governmental bailout, for the objective of 
restructuring companies deemed important for the national economy. Bankruptcy does not necessarily 
lead to disappearance of the company; the bankruptcy procedure allows the companies to reemerge, on 
condition of realizing stringent restructuring and management replacement. This appears to be a case of 
                                                          
1
 John Fingleton (Head of British Office of Fair Trading) noted in 2009:“?In a recession, the short-run may be prioritized.” 
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/2009/spe0109.pdf (accessed 17 January 2012), p.4. 
Page 3 of 17 
 
Japan Airlines (JAL)
2
, which filed for bankruptcy in 2010, went through slimming down, and is to be 
enlisted on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in 2012.  
The JAL case may be contrasted with the US government’s bailout of the US automobile 
companies—GM and Chrysler.  Government’s bailout of failing companies gives misguided message to 
companies: if you become big enough, the government will rescue you when you fail due to poor 
management. Short term success of preserving employment in the US automobile sector needs to be 
discounted from the consideration of long- run diminished vitality of the overall US economy. 
In spite of the apparent success of the JAL case, Japanese government has not addressed well to 
the task of economic policy in times of economic difficulties. Actually, Japanese government has bailed 
out failing companies much more often than both the US government and the EU Commission, to the 
detriment of competition and vitality of Japanese economy. In case of JAL, the government bailed out 
JAL prior to resorting to the bankruptcy procedure (a court-led restructuring within the bankruptcy 
system, equivalent of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code). The JAL bailout was conducted through 
the state controlled bailout vehicle-- the Enterprise Turnaround Initiative Corporation (ETIC)
3
 , a state-
controlled investment fund that has been given authority over the rebuilding endeavor.  This public 
funding vehicle was originally created with the objective of aiding small-and-medium companies in local 
area.
4
 Nevertheless, ETIC (and its predecessor) has come to provide funds with big established 
corporations: among others, JAL, Kanebo Ltd and Misawa Homes Group. 
                                                          
2 See Mure Dickie “JAL provides blueprint for others to follow”, Financial Times (10 January 2012). 
3
   The predecessor of ETIC—Industrial Revitalization Corporation (Sangyo Saisei Kiko)—was established by the government in 
2003 within Deposit Insurance Corporation as an extraordinary measure in times of systemic risk in Japanese finance and 
economy, operating until 2007. ETIC was established by the government in 2009 as a virtual successor of Industrial 
Revitalization Co. For ETIC, see http://www.etic-j.co.jp/pdf/english.pdf (accessed 19 May 2012). 
4
 See the ETIC website (id) at “Background”: “Japan’s local economies have long been struggling with a wide range of problems, 
including increasingly intense competition… [ETIC] was established to provide support by revitalizing the corporations that 
underpin local economies”. 
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 In case of Kanebo Ltd, Kanebo was facing bankruptcy after committing “window dressing” in 
violation of Japanese securities law, but Industrial Revitalization Co. (the predecessor of ETIC), in 2004, 
bailed out  Kanebo through providing governmental guarantee to finances provided by private banks.
5
  
The infusion of the bank finance saved Kanebo Ltd from bankruptcy. Then, Industrial Revitalization Co. 
proceeded to auction off promising branches of Kanebo Ltd. The most prominent branch—cosmetics—
was bought by Kao Corporation and became its subsidiary. 
JAL was facing bankruptcy in 2010 due to its poor management with overcompensation to its 
employees. Then, ETIC bailed out JAL through loan of up to 400 billion yen (which was provided from 
Japanese government to ETIC)
6
, as well as providing governmental guarantee to finances provided by 
private banks.
7
  At the same time, ETIC made use of the Corporate Rehabilitation Law--an equivalent of 
Chapter 11 procedure in the US. Through this court- overseen rehabilitation procedure, JAL eliminated 
one third of its workforce and radically reduced its operation.
8
  
The fact that the bailed-out companies —GM and Chrysler in the US, Kanebo and JAL in Japan—got 
revived and have regained profitability should not be taken as a proof of success of the bailout. This is 
because bailouts undermined the principle of creative destruction. Those companies could not revive 
without the governmental subsidies. Bailing out such companies obstructed growth of competent 
existing companies as well as new entries. In case of JAL, the bankruptcy procedure (restructuring 
                                                          
5
 The governmental guarantee renders bank finance risk free, resulting in lending rate on a par with that of Japanese 
government bond:  Source: speech by Mr. Kazuhiko Toyama (a former executive at Industrial Revitalization Co.) at Competition 
Policy Research Center (CPRC), “State Involvement in Corporate Revival and Competition Policy” (Tokyo, JFTC Conference Room, 
18 May 2012). 
6
 See Hajime Hatakeyama, “JAL No Saisei Mondai (Issues regarding the JAL Rehabilitation)”, Rippo to Chosa (Legislation and 
Research) (2010), No.301, p.170, Japanese version available at 
http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/rippou_chousa/backnumber/2010pdf/20100201169.pdf (Accessed 8 June 
2012).  
7
  Id, and Kazuo Toyama supra note 5. 
8
 See Gwen Robinson “JAL’s kamikaze bankruptcy”, ft.com/alphaville, Financial Times (19 January 2012), available at 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/blog/2010/01/19/128946/jals-kamikaze-bankruptcy/ (accessed 19 May 2012). 
Page 5 of 17 
 
program equivalent with the Chapter 11 procedure) was utilized concurrently with the governmental 
bailout. The concurrent use of the bankruptcy procedure should not be interpreted as eliminating vice 
of the bailout, because the bankruptcy procedure was utilized merely as a vehicle for the company’s 
bailout.  
Another vice of bailouts—in Japan, exercised through use of ETIC—is its opacity. Most 
fundamentally, no objective criteria are able to be formed on what sort of failing companies should be 
selected to be bailed out.  On the pretext of opaque “public necessity” or “emergency”, any major 
corporation may seek bailouts, and pressure from special interests exerted through politics makes it 
extremely difficult for an agency in charge of bailouts to refuse resorting to bailouts, particularly when 
the governmental agency was created exactly to exercise bailouts—case of ETIC in Japan (“Enterprise 
Turnaround” is a euphemism for bailouts). Indeed, Japan in recent years has not seen bankruptcy of any 
major corporation; practically all major failing companies have been bailed out. 
Bailing out failing companies may be supported only as an extraordinary measure to deal with 
economy wide “systemic risk”. Japan may have been in such a stage of systemic risk around 2003, when 
the government created Industrial Revitalization Corporation, because accumulation of failing 
companies put their lenders-- Japanese banks-- to the brink of systemic collapse. However, Japan has 
already recovered from such systemic crisis; Industrial Revitalization Corporation, therefore, was 
terminated in 2007. Creation by the government of current ETIC cannot be rationalized by systemic risk; 
the creation only reflects the government yielding to special interests demanding governmental bailouts. 
Moreover, years after 2007 saw, in Japan, creation of several “private equity” companies, which provide, 
as a business, working capital to target companies.  Private equity companies, in contrast with 
governmental agencies, act on the basis of market mechanism. Failing companies, if they have a 
business potential, are able to get capital from private equity companies. Otherwise, they should go 
through the bankruptcy procedure. 
Page 6 of 17 
 
 
B. Industrial Policy in Times of Economic Difficulties 
Industrial policy in Japan has mostly been conducted by the Ministry of Economy and Industry (the 
METI, renamed from the MITI in 2001). Japanese industrial policy, contrary to a prevalent western 
perception, has mainly engaged in protecting declining industries rather than nourishing cutting-edge 
industries. (The industrial policies coping with declining industries have accompanied exemption from 
competition law. This aspect of the industrial policy is covered in II.A. ) 
Although not as frequent as the industrial policy for protecting declining industries, the METI has 
engaged in industrial policy for nurturing promising industries. Nevertheless, free market economists 
have long highlighted incapability of bureaucrats to outguess markets in picking successful industries. 
This observation has proved to be true for Japan. A typical case of such failure was the METI’s (at that 
time, the MITI’s) backing of main-frame computer technology with vast subsidies to Fujitsu, Hitachi and 
other electric companies. In the 1980s, the main frame computer appeared to be the promising future 
industry. Nevertheless, markets turned out to pick personal computer and software companies as 
successful industry leaders.  
The Japanese government has considerably diminished the role of industrial policy since entering 
the 1990s. Nevertheless, the METI has not ceased to engage in industrial policy for picking future 
successful industries. The vision paper on industrial policy put forth by the METI in 2010
9
 advocates that 
the government reshuffles industries through selecting promising industries. This policy vision has been 
publicized as a key measure for increasing international competitiveness of Japanese companies, which 
have lagged behind not only the US companies but also the leading Korean companies (Samsung etc.). 
However, industrial policy has consistently proved ineffective for invigorating Japanese economy.  It is 
                                                          
9
 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Sangyo-Kozo Vision 2010 (Industry Structure Vision 2010), p.12, Japanese version 
only available at http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/summary/0004660/index.html (accessed 27 May 2011). 
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time the METI as well as the Japanese government learn that bureaucrats cannot outguess markets in 
picking successful industries. After Japan accomplished catch up with the advanced western economies 
in the 1980s, merits of industrial policy were lost because bureaucracy cannot override wisdom of the 
market after losing evident models to emulate. After the bust of property and stock price bubbles in 
1991, Japanese economy entered the prolonged recession.   
Revitalization of the Japanese economy, first, necessitates sound macro- economic (fiscal and 
monetary) policy. Concurrently, Japan is in need of vigorous competition policy because the Japanese 
economy is characterized by its “dual structure”: a highly productive manufacturing sector on the one 
hand and less productive agriculture and service sectors on the other.
10
 In order to increase productivity, 
Japan needs to implement regulatory reform and competition policy, in place of industrial policy. 
C. Regulatory Reform in Times of Economic Difficulties 
Japan is in need of regulatory reforms in order to increase productivity of its inefficient industries— 
domestic industries, particularly agriculture and service.
11
  However, Japanese politics makes it difficult 
to overhaul regulations which have protected vested interests.  This deficiency in politics is partly due to 
the fact that politicians, most of them coming from hereditary local magnates, are preoccupied with 
getting budget money for satisfying local special-interests in their voting districts, at the sacrifice of 
national interests. Another deficiency is unjust (and unconstitutional) allocation of Diet (parliament) 
members across local districts: disproportionately large number of Diet members has been allocated to 
rural areas at the expense of cities. Politicians representing rural areas are generally conservative, being 
averse to regulatory reforms. The political stance against change and innovation is augmented in times 
                                                          
10
 Naohiro Yashiro, "Case Study 1 – Japan", Regulatory Reform for Recovery: Lessons from Implementation during Crises (OECD, 
2010), p.77. 
11
  The IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (2012) reports that Japan is ranked at 27th among 59 countries-- available at 
http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf (accessed 4 June 2012). This is a conspicuous decline 
from Japan’s top tier ranking in the 1990s. 
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of economic difficulties because people tend to stick to current employment rather than moving to new 
industries. 
Against this political background, pressure from international institutions and the US to open up the 
Japanese economy has historically played a vital role in realizing deregulation of industries as well as 
reforming regulations towards increased competition. Pressure from outside is important for Japan 
because Japanese politics renders it difficult to break up the status quos, with special-interest groups 
exerting disproportionately strong political influence. The government has been only able to defeat 
status quo on the pretext of obeying international obligations. 
Japan’s membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT, the predecessor of 
the WTO) in 1955 has greatly contributed to Japan’s postwar rapid economic growth through reductions 
of tariff rates for Japan’s manufactured goods. More importantly for the topic of this paper, GATT/WTO 
has been instrumental for the government to push back protectionist initiatives from domestic 
industries and politicians. 
However, liberalization movement from WTO has recently been stalled, with the Doha Round of 
WTO facing failure. After the marked success of pro-competition regulatory reforms performed under 
the leadership of Premier Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006), Japanese politics has resumed catering to 
special interests. Most markedly in this trend, Japanese Diet, with the full agreement between ruling 
Democratic Party and opposing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), on 27 April 2012, passed a bill scrapping 
a deadline for full privatization of Japan Post’s financial arms.
12
 
                                                          
12
 Mure Dickie “Japan fails to deliver a growth strategy”, Financial Times (May 13, 2012).  The original reform plan (set up by 
Premier Koizumi) obligated the government to fully privatize Japan Post through sales of all its government-held shares by the 
end of September 2017.  However, the share sale was suspended by a bill in 2009. Shares of Japan Post, therefore, are currently 
held 100% by the government. By this new bill in 2012, the government is now only able (not obligated to) sell two thirds of 
Japan Post shares to the public.  
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In order to stem this trend, Japan needs to utilize Free Trade Agreements (FTA) for newly exerting 
pressure on special-interests toward pro-competition regulatory reforms. Japan has already entered 11 
FTAs, but none of them contain as partners top tier economic powers: the US, EU and China. Then, 
recently, the Japanese government has started to negotiate FTAs respectively with the US and EU
13: 
The former is within the framework of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)14 —a new FTA whose 
predominant member is the US. 
For the Japanese government, TPP is virtually equivalent with an FTA with the US. For this reason, 
proponents for existing regulations have warned on the risk of being pressured into acceding to the 
nationalistic interests of the US, particularly in the area of agriculture and medical service. However, 
Japan has already experienced several trade/regulation negotiations with the US. Due to Japan’s 
dependence on the US for its major export market as well as national defense, Japanese government 
has had special weakness towards the US demand for opening up Japanese economy. The most 
representative of such Japan/US negotiation was the U.S.-Japan Structural Impediment Initiative (the SII). 
15
  Through the SII, the Japanese government pledged to loosen several anticompetitive regulations (i.e. 
softening of regulation on large scale retailers’ opening), as well as to strengthen the competition law 
(the Antimonopoly Act: AMA) and its enforcement: strengthening of criminal penalties, and heavy 
condemnation of bid-riggings. The experience of the SII shows that Japanese government is capable of 
utilizing pressure from the US in order to accomplish pro-competition regulatory reforms, to the benefit 
of consumers and Japanese economy.  
                                                          
13
 Regarding EU/Japan FTA, see Joshua Chaffin “Brussels to push for Japan trade deal”, Financial Times (July 17, 2012) 
(Reporting that the European Commission is expected to ask EU member states for permission to launch negotiations with 
Japan on a free trade agreement).  
14
 Former Prime Minister Naoto Kan, on October 2010, and new Prime Minister Noda, on November 2011, expressed the 
Government’s intent to apply for the membership in TPP. Nevertheless, farmers’ associations have been harshly opposing to 
this project. 
15
 See Joint Report of U.S.-Japan Working Group on Structural Impediments Initiative 2 (28 June 1990); USTR, National Trade 
Estimate Report of Foreign Trade Barriers 107 (1990). 
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II. Competition Law Enforcement in Times of Economic Difficulties 
 
A. Competition Law Exemption for Depressed Industries 
As to specific considerations to be given to competition law enforcement in times of economic 
difficulties, the most often utilized method has been exempting depressed industries from the 
competition law. However, logically, no rationale can be found for exempting depressed industries from 
competition law enforcement. Such exemption weakens competition discipline, delaying necessary 
restructuring. Yet businesses, in times of economic crisis, tend to appeal to the government for 
exempting them from competition law, and the government often accedes to the demand as a 
politically feasible choice. 
In Japan, from the 1950s to the 1970s, several measures exempting certain industry sectors from 
competition law had been implemented by the MITI (currently METI). These measures had been 
initiated by the industries and the MITI to prompt the Diet to inaugurate laws on industrial policy to deal 
with “structurally depressed industries” – principally textile industries which had lost international 
competitiveness. These industries had experienced long-lasting overcapacity in relation to the level of 
demand.  
The MITI named such industrial policy targeted at the “structurally depressed industries” as the 
“industry adjustment policy”, addressed to chronic overcapacity of several industries: initially textile 
Page 11 of 17 
 
industries later extended to chemical industries.
16
 For this adjustment policy, the MITI routinely 
instructed the companies to form cartels for concertedly reducing production amounts. 
 Production reduction cartels are in breach of the Antimonopoly Act (AMA)—Japanese competition 
law. In this context, an economic ministry’s guidance (without use of a mandatory law) has no legal 
power to exonerate the guided companies from the illegality under the AMA.
17
  Nevertheless, up to 
around the end of the 1970s, the Fair Trade Commission of Japan (the JFTC) had been politically 
overwhelmed by the powerful MITI; JFTC had not ventured to attack cartels which are authorized by the 
MITI. More importantly, the Japanese Diet consented to the MITI in inaugurating legislations authorizing 
exemption of “structurally depressed industries” from the AMA.  These cartels authorized by special 
laws are legally outside the coverage of the AMA.
18
 
The policy question relevant today regarding the “industrial adjustment policy” is whether any 
rationale may be found for preferring governmental intervention to market mechanism in order to bring 
about industry adjustments. The market usually functions well to reduce oversupply and overcapacity in 
depressed industries.  Notable economists pointed out that the market works to reduce oversupply in a 
socially desirable speed.
19
  Indeed, the industrial adjustment policy in Japan has slowed down speed of 
                                                          
16 For information on “industrial adjustment policy” of Japan, see Itoh, M., Kiyono, K., Okuno-Fujiwara, M. & Suzumura, K. 
(1991) Economic Analysis of Industrial Policy, Academic Press, San Diego, California, Chapter 21. 
17
 This is because a ministry’s guidance intrinsically lacks compulsory power over companies, without penalties against non-
observance. This standpoint was confirmed in the JFTC Guidelines on Administrative Guidance: The JFTC, Guidelines Concerning 
Administrative Guidance under the Antimonopoly Act (30 June1994), at §1 (1) (“Without exemption clauses, private conduct 
induced by administrative guidance is subject to the AMA application, when the conduct fulfills the conditions for illegality 
under the AMA.”), translation available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_guidelines/antimonopoly_guidelines.html 
(accessed 27May 2011). 
18 For example, “Seni Kogyo Setsubi Rinji Soch Ho (Temporary Measure Law on Production Facilities in the Textile Industry)” was 
inaugurated on May, 1956, exempting the companies in the industry from application of the Antimonopoly Act. 
19
 See Michael Mussa (1982) “Government Policy and the Adjustment Process”, in J. Bhagwati ed., Import Competition and 
Response, University of Chicago Press, cited in Itoh et al. supra note 16, Chapter 21. 
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reduction in production capacity in the depressed industries because the policy slowed down exits of 
companies and employees from the depressed industries. 
One may rationalize the government intervention for slowing down companies’ exit from 
depressed (or internationally uncompetitive) industries as socially desirable for protecting employment. 
Such rationale has been brought up in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in the context of “Trade and Structural Adjustment”.
20
  The OECD, then, reached the position 
that adjustment policy needs to be in harmony with free trade; government intervention should not 
delay necessary structural adjustments in response to the industries’ relative decline in international 
competitiveness.  Government intervention for slowing down exits of inefficient industries hampers 
both domestic adjustments and international free trade. Needed are macro-economic policies to foster 
growth. Concurrently, labor market policies need to be improved in order to facilitate labor mobilities 
across occupations.  
In Japan, the Japanese government and the MITI, prior to the end of the 1970s, had largely ceased 
to engage in anticompetitive adjustment policies.  This policy change was partly induced by Japan’s 
entry into the GATT (1955) and OECD (1964), which obliged Japan to observe free trade and investment.  
This obligation has hampered the Japanese government from engaging in blatantly protectionist or 
anticompetitive industrial policies. Without such international obligation, the Japanese government 
would have found it difficult not to accede to protectionist demands from domestic industries and 
politicians.  
Moreover, Japan’s rapid economic growth up to the 1970s augmented Japan’s international 
standing, bringing increasing trade friction with the US in the 1960s and the 1970s. In this context, Japan 
has special weakness towards pressure from the US, because of the US’s preeminence as Japan’s export 
                                                          
20
 See OECD (2005), Trade and Structural Adjustment, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/40/34753254.pdf 
(accessed 20 January 2012). 
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market, together with Japan’s dependence on the US army for military defense. Need for managing the 
US-Japan economic and political relations has kept the Japanese government from engaging in blatantly 
protectionist/ anticompetitive policies.  
The aggravating US/ Japan trade frictions culminated in  the U.S.-Japan Structural Impediment 
Initiative (1989-90),
21
 which led the Japanese government to strengthen the AMA and its enforcement 
with the objective of opening up Japanese markets. This resulted in strengthening of fines and criminal 
penalties, as well as stricter condemnation of bid-riggings. 
The MITI has continued to push the Diet to inaugurate industrial adjustment legislations during the 
1970s and 1980s, but the legislations’ anticompetitive nature has consistently been reduced. The last of 
special legislation exempting industries from the AMA was “Industrial Restructuring Law (Sanko-Ho)” 
(1983-87), which designated several industries (i.e. petrochemical industry) for industrial policies aiming 
at supply reduction. The Law provided companies with limited exemptions from the AMA. Nevertheless, 
greatly mitigating the anticompetitive nature of the exemptions, the exemptions required approval from 
the JFTC, preceded by the JFTC’s consultation with MITI.   
 
B.  Depression Cartels and Rationalization Cartels 
The Antimonopoly Act (AMA) of Japan used to contain a clause exonerating depression cartels, but 
the clause was repealed on occasion of the AMA amendment of 1999. Now defunct AMA clause on the 
depression cartel stipulated that the JFTC tolerates cartels on prices, production quantities, or reduction 
of production facilities in depressed industries, in which average production costs surpass the products’ 
prices.  These depression cartels had been exercised in steel industry and textile industry.  
                                                          
21
 See Joint Report of U.S.-Japan Working Group on Structural Impediments Initiative (28 June 1990); USTR, National Trade 
Estimate Report of Foreign Trade Barriers 107 (1990). 
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Allowing depression cartels makes no economic sense because cartels retard exit of inefficient 
producers, thus slowing down the industry’s restructuring. The repeal in 1999 of the depression cartel 
provision in the AMA was realized within a governmental policy (accomplished in the 1990s) of radically 
reducing exempted cartels, which include repeals of exemptions for natural monopoly and 
rationalization cartels. The repeal of the AMA exemptions was conducted within the government-wide 
economic liberalization and regulatory reforms. 
Among these repealed exemptions, the repeal of the exemption for rationalization cartels needs to 
be scrutinized for its rationale, because rationalization cartels—cooperation in improving production 
and distribution—should not be treated as belonging to a same group as depression cartels. 
Rationalization cartels, in contrast with depression cartels, often contribute to economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare, on condition that they do not give rise to market power. Small and medium 
companies often necessitate concerted arrangement for improving production or distribution. Such 
rationalization endeavors are especially called for in times of economic difficulties. 
The AMA repeal of the rationalization cartel exemption does not mandate the JFTC to always reject 
rationalization cartels. The JFTC is capable of applying the AMA in ways to allow rationalization cartels; 
the AMA provision on concerted actions (the AMA article 2 (6)) stipulates that concerted actions among 
competitors are illegal only when they lead to market power (“substantial restriction of competition”). 
Therefore, the JFTC is expected to allow concerted actions among small/ medium companies for 
improving efficiencies, although we have not yet witnessed actual cases.     
 
C.  Failing Company Defense in Merger Regulation 
 “Failing company” defense has been put forward, in times of economic difficulties, to defend 
mergers which otherwise would be blocked by competition agencies as anticompetitive. The defender 
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of the merger would insist that the merger involving a failing company would save economic loss caused 
by dissolution of the company’s assets and human capital. 
However, the failing company defense, thus put forward, ignores the fact that economy benefits 
from exits of failed companies; the exits put the failed companies’ assets and human capital to more 
efficient and creative use. This merit was highlighted as “creative destruction” by Joseph Schumpeter.   
The competition law agencies in US and EU do not support the failed company defense 
interpreted in this sense. Nevertheless, the “failing company” defense, interpreted in a different manner, 
has been utilized in both jurisdictions. The defense has been deemed relevant in the sense that a failing 
company’s contribution to the merging company’s market power is smaller than estimated from the 
failing company’s market share.  The failing company defense, thus interpreted, does not compromise 
the spirit and objective of competition laws. 
The US antitrust agencies (Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission) explain in 
their common Horizontal Merger Guidelines: “a merger is not likely to enhance market power if 
imminent failure… of one of the merging firms would cause the assets of that firm to exit the relevant 
market.”
22
 This standpoint stems from the consumer benefit objective of the antitrust law; “If the 
relevant assets would otherwise exit the market, customers are not worse off after the merger than 
they would have been had the merger been enjoined.”
23
 From this stance, the Guidelines set up rigorous 
standards in order to secure that the alleged failing firm is actually expected to exit the market: four 
conditions including that the allegedly failing firm would be unable to meet its financial obligations in 
the near future.
24
 
                                                          
22
 The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), i11, available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf 
(accessed 10 June 2012). 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. 
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The European Commission’s standpoint on the failing company defense is essentially the same 
as that of the US antitrust agencies. The EU Merger Guidelines explain: “The Commission may decide 
that an otherwise problematic merger is nevertheless compatible with the common market if one of the 
merging parties is a failing firm. The basic requirement is that the deterioration of the competitive 
structure that follows the merger cannot be said to be caused by the merger.” 
25
 
For Japan, the JFTC basically adopts the same narrow interpretation on the failing company 
defense; the JFTC explains in its Business Combination Guidelines that a failing company defense is 
considered as one of the elements alleviating market power. The Business Combination Guidelines 
explain: In the case that one of the merging partners is highly likely to go into liquidation, and at the 
same time, a less anticompetitive measure cannot be found other than the merger, the merger 
generally will be considered not to substantially restrict competition.
26
   
 
 Conclusion 
Economic crisis does not necessitate softening of competition law and policy; on the contrary, it 
necessitates consistent application of competition law together with pro-competition regulatory 
reforms. Rapid and sudden worsening of economic conditions has been caused by unsound macro-
economic policies-- fiscal and monetary policies. In order to recover from economic downturn, sound 
macroeconomic policies are first called for. Second, sound microeconomic policies—pro-competition 
regulatory reforms and application of competition laws—need to be consistently maintained in order to 
force enterprises to restructure and engage in innovations. 
                                                          
25
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the Control Of Concentrations between Undertakings (2004), para. 89. 
26
 The JFTC, Guidelines to Application of the Antimonopoly Act Concerning Review of Business Combination (2004, revised 2007 
and 2009) at §IV.2 (8), translation available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_guidelines/ama/pdf/RevisedMergerGuidelines.pdf (accessed 28 May 2012).  
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Japanese experience shows that enterprises in non-competitive industries, backed by politicians, 
tend to demand industrial policies accompanied with exemptions from competition law. However, such 
anti-competitive policies retard industry restructuring. Governments need to counter protectionist 
moves by use of international obligations. In case of Japan, the government’s international obligation 
under GATT and other international treaties were instrumental for the government’s not acceding to 
protectionist pressures.  Not only multilateral agreements but also bilateral free trade agreements need 
to be utilized in order to push back protectionist pressure and promote free trade and pro-competition 
policies.  
